![]() The Germans were still certain they were up against an insignificant enemy force. French artillery fired upon all entrances into the village to discourage them all night, and de Langlade's tanks blocked all possible movement. Meanwhile, the Panthers pulled up to Dompaire. De Langlade requested air support and received assurance that fighter bombers would take to the skies as soon as the weather improved. Meanwhile, the infantry entrenched on the wooded hills under cover from tanks and tank destroyers. German tanks continued making their way to the hills south-west of Dompaire.ĭarkness fell by 21:00. The French decided to retreat, as the silhouettes of their tanks and tank destroyers were lit up by the explosions. Seven shots were fired at the second tank, fruitlessly, while the Panther was able to knock out Languedoc with one shot. ![]() The duel started out well, and the third shot knocked out a Panther. The crew received burns, but the fire was put out.Ī Sherman named Languedoc engaged two Panthers at the same time at a range of 600-800 meters. A tank named Corsica also fired on the Germans, but its 75 mm shells ricocheted and a Panther's return fire set it ablaze. A French M10 named "Simun" snuck up close to the enemy among the trees and burned up a Panther with two shots, and not just any Panther but a command tank. Right from the march, the French were able to destroy a German gun. In a quick engagement, they "traded" one Panther for one Sherman.Īt 17:30, near a road from Dompaire to Epinal, a tank column commanded by Jacques Masseux engaged Panthers and German anti-tank guns in battle. The first to draw blood was the 4th Tank Squadron led by Lieutenant Jean Bailaud. The French controlled all hills around the settlement, with the Germans in the lowlands. These events unfolded near the Dompaire village. On September 12th, 1944, the Germans paid for his mistakes. Von Usedom split his tank spearhead, hoped in vain that weather would ground Allied aircraft, and neglected to perform reconnaissance. Even with an experienced commander like von Usedom, it was hard to expect a miracle, especially since he made several critical mistakes during planning of the battle. The 112th brigade was composed of poorly trained recruits who had yet to smell gunpowder. Second, it was long since Germany could provide high quality fresh tank units. One, thanks to intelligence and reports by locals, they were informed about movement of a large mass of German tanks. Two more factors played into the hands of the French tankers. It would be incorrect to treat de Langlade's positions as inherently hopeless. These were no Panthers, but the French also had four times as much artillery and Allied aircraft ruled the skies. The French had 48 Sherman tanks, 5 light Stuarts, and 11 M10 Wolverine tank destroyers. The artillery department was lacking: von Usedom only had six AT guns and five howitzers at his disposal.ĭe Langlade's group was at a decisive disadvantage when it came to tanks. Various sources count 600-800 infantrymen. ![]() The brigade was well equipped: 45 of its 109 tanks and SPG were the picky but deadly Panthers. ![]() The Germans sent elements of the 112th Tank Brigade into battle, commanded by Horst von Usedom. Now de Langlade, having scorned his enemy, had to deal with the consequences of his success. The Germans decided to deliver a counterattack to correct matters. His decisive actions threatened German units south of Nancy with encirclement. Colonel Paul de Langlade was the leader among leaders. Leclerc's 2nd Armoured Division was confidently leading the Allied offensive in Lorraine. In the late summer and early fall of 1944, F. ![]()
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